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Limitations in terms of legislation
Section 1 of the South African Constitution, 1996, states that ‘[t]his
Constitution is the supreme law of the Republic; law or conduct inconsis-
tent with it is invalid, and the obligations imposed by it must be fulfilled.’
Section 9(4) read with s9(3) of the Constitution prohibits ‘unfair’ discrim-
ination based on ‘one or more grounds, including race, gender, sex, preg-
nancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation,
age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth.’ 
Statutory limitations are also found in the Maintenance of Surviving
Spouses Act (27 of 1990); Pension Funds Act (24 of 1956); the Immovable
Property Act (94 of 1965); and the Trust Property Control Act (57 of 1988).
Discriminatory provisions found in wills have been challenged in a number of
court cases since the introduction of the new constitutional dispensation in
South Africa. We look at six cases in this article. Four of the cases deal with
discriminatory provisions found in wills that applied in the public sphere
(public wills) and the remaining two cases deal with discriminatory provisions
found in wills that applied in the private sphere (private wills). The first four
cases deal with public wills. They are important as they are the first cases in
the South African context to challenge discriminative provisions found in
wills. The remaining two cases are more recent and deal with private wills.
Case law involving discriminatory provisions found in wills
The first case looked at is Minister of Education and Another v Syfrets Trust
Ltd NO and Another 2006 (4) SA 205 (C). The judgment was handed
Freedom of testation is a basic right in terms of theSouth African law of succession and enables atestator (or testatrix) to bequeath assets in a will
as they please. The freedom is not completely unrestricted.
Limitations are based on social and economic considera-
tions and are found in statutory and common law princi-
ples. An example of a common law limitation is that a
testator may not incorporate a provision in a will that is
contrary to public policy. This article – the first in a two
part series – analyses the limitations with regard to dis-
crimination. These limitations are viewed in terms of
both legislation and case law. 
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down by the Western Cape High Court. The judgment concerned discrim-
inatory testamentary provisions found in a public charitable trust. The
trust awarded bursaries to students. Eligibility for the bursaries was limited
to persons of European descent. The requirements excluded females as well
as persons of Jewish descent. An
order in terms of s13 of the Trust
Property Control Act (TPCA) was
sought for the deletion of the dis-
criminatory provisions from the
trust deed. This was on the basis
that s13 enables the court to vary
provisions in a trust instrument if
the court believes ‘the founder of
the trust did not contemplate or
foresee’ the consequences, the com-
mon law which prohibits bequests
that are contrary to public policy,
and direct application of the equality
provisions found in the
Constitution. The court upheld the
challenge and dealt with the case
on the basis of existing common law principles which prohibit bequests
that are contrary to public policy with due regard to the spirit, purport, and
objects of the Bill of Rights. It found that public policy was rooted in the
Constitution and the values enshrined there. The court held that the pub-
lic policy that was relevant was the one that prevailed at the time of the
enquiry and not at the time when the trust deed was drafted; the testa-
mentary provisions were contrary to public policy as they unfairly discrimi-
nate against persons on the basis of race, gender, and religion. The relief
sought in Syfrets Trust Ltd was simply to widen the pool of prospective
applicants for the bursaries. It was not to take away benefits from particular
persons. It should be noted that the bursaries applied in the public sphere
and for an indefinite period of time. 
The second case is Ex Parte: BOE Trust Ltd [2009 and 2012] (BOE Trust
Ltd) (Ex Parte BOE Trust Ltd and Others 2009 (6) SA 470 (WCC)). The
matter was initially heard at the Western Cape High Court and later taken
on appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA). The case again dealt
with discriminatory testamentary provisions found in a public charitable
trust that awarded bursaries to students. Eligibility for the bursaries was lim-
ited to ‘White’ South Africans. An order was sought for the deletion of the
discriminatory provisions from the trust deed. The order was sought on the
basis of s13 of the TPCA, the common law, and direct application of the
equality provisions found in the Constitution. The high court looked at
public policy and constitutional considerations. It held that it was ‘not satis-
fied that the provisions concerned are as clearly contrary to public policy as
the trustees believe. Section 9(3) of the Constitution proscribes discrimina-
tion which is unfair. It is recognised that discrimination designed to achieve
a legitimate objective is not unfair. Such legitimate objectives are, for
example, the need to redress past injustices based on gender and race.’ It
stated that no-one has a right to inherit a benefit (and thus the right not to
be totally or partially disinherited) in terms of a will or trust. It further stat-
ed that freedom of testation includes the right to benefit some persons and
not others. The court held that conduct should only be regarded as contrary
to public policy if it unfairly discriminates between persons. It held that the
provisions were not contrary to public policy as they had a legitimate pur-
pose. The testatrix ‘thought [it] fit to require beneficiaries of the bursary
trust to return to South Africa for a period determined by the universities
concerned after obtaining their doctorates. It seems at least possible that, in
so doing, she was seeking to ameliorate this skills loss and indeed, to pro-
mote importation of skills obtained overseas’ (See also King NO and Others v
De Jager and Others 2017 (4) All SA 57 (WCC)). The reliance on s13 of
the TPCA also failed. This section ‘allows a court to enter the mind of the
testator by interpreting the trust instrument to determine if it ‘contains any
provision which brings about consequences which in the opinion of the
court’ the testator did not contemplate or foresee.’ It held that the appli-
cants did not ‘make out any case that circumstances unforeseen by the tes-
tatrix have had any effect on the implementation of the bursary bequest in
order to justify … interference by the court under the power conferred by
s13 of the Act.’ The matter was taken on appeal to the Supreme Court of
Appeal. The appeal was, however, unsuccessful (Ex Parte BOE Trust Ltd
2013 (3) SA 236 (SCA)). 
The relief sought in BOE Trust Ltd is similar to that sought in Syfrets
Trust Ltd. It was simply to widen the pool of prospective applicants for the
bursaries. It was not to take away benefits from particular persons. The bur-
saries applied in the public sphere and for an indefinite period of time. The
difference between BOE Trust Ltd and Syfrets Trust Ltd is that the discrimi-
nation in BOE Trust Ltd had a legitimate purpose. The high court held in
BOE Trust Ltd that the provisions were not contrary to public policy as it
also had a legitimate purpose.  
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